The Roman Philosopher Lucius Anneaus Seneca (4 BCE-65 CE) was perhaps the first to note the universal trend that growth is slow but ruin is rapid. I call this tendency the "Seneca Effect."
Showing posts with label Ethiopia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ethiopia. Show all posts

Thursday, September 22, 2022

Who Controls Those who Control Us? Why a Lone man at the top is the Most Dangerous Thing in the World

In the game of chess, you win when you eliminate your opponent's king. In the real world, instead, killing the enemy leader is a much less effective strategy in comparison to being able to influence his choices in ways that harm his side. Here, I am examining the case of Benito Mussolini in Italy. Could it be that Mussolini was influenced, if not controlled, by the British secret services? It may have been one of the first cases of "one-man psyops" designed with the purpose of taking control of the mind of an enemy leader. Maybe something similar can explain some of the horribly bad decisions that our leaders are taking nowadays.


It never was a secret that Benito Mussolini started his political career as a shill for the British secret services. His task was pushing Italy to join the allies in World War One. Recent data show that, in 1917, he was still being paid by the British M15 to the tune of 100 pounds per week, a respectable sum at that time. 

We don't know what role the British Services had in Italy in the events after the end of WW1, but it is likely that they continued to support Mussolini, directly or indirectly. The British wanted a stable Italy that they saw as a staunch ally and a barrier against the ambitions of rival powers in the Mediterranean sea. Italy had played that role from when it had been created as a unified state, in 1861, with the help and financing of the British.

Italy was friendly to Britain, yes, but not a disinterested friend. Italians wanted something in exchange for their friendship, and they had it in the form of coal. Italy had no significant coal reserves, it was fully dependent on imports. It was British coal that had created the Italian industrial economy, from the early 1800s onward. That created a relationship between the two countries that many defined as a true brotherhood (fratellanza). But things changed in 1913, when Britain went through its "peak coal." Production stopped increasing and was disrupted by strikes and social unrest. 


Britain still had enough coal for its internal needs, but exports were affected. This was especially bad for Italy, which saw a precipitous drop in coal imports after the end of WWI. At that time, the change of mood toward the British in Italy was palpable. D. H. Lawrence reports in his "Sea and Sardinia," published in 1921, how insulting the "English" was a common subject of conversation among Italians. 

Now, put yourself in the shoes of someone who managed the British secret services in the early 1930s. It must have been clear to them that there was a problem with Italy. An enormous problem. Germany's coal production was still increasing and Germany could easily supply 100% of Italy's needs. Then, Italy and Germany were natural allies. Germany had no direct strategic interests in the Mediterranean sea, while Italy could use Germany's support to become the leading Mediterranean power. By taking control of the Suez Canal, Italy could effectively kick Britain out of the Mediterranean: truly a disaster for the British Empire. (Italy actually tried to do exactly that in 1940).

And then, Mussolini himself: another headache for the British who were discovering that they had created a golem they couldn't control. In 1933-34 two more things happened that made the situation critical. First, in 1933 Adolf Hitler took power in Germany. Then, in 1934, Mussolini held a referendum that gave him a majority of 99.84% percent of the votes. The two dictators shared views and methods, and the road was now open to the Rome-Berlin "Axis." It would be formalized in 1936.

Again, let's see the situation from the viewpoint of the British. Facing a confrontation with Germany, it was vital for them to do something to remove Italy from the game or, at least, to weaken it considerably. But how? Directly toppling Mussolini was unthinkable. But it may well be that the British still had some direct communication channels with him (and, by the way, Mussolini could speak English). So, when you have to deal with someone who is too powerful to attack directly, you use indirect means. Find his weak spot, and set up a trap. And Mussolini did have a weak spot: his dream of rebuilding the Roman Empire. 

Up to 1934, the Imperial dreams of Mussolini had been mostly for show: people dressed like ancient Romans parading in the streets, the ubiquitous "fascio" symbol, and the outstretched arm in the "Roman Salute," even though the Romans had never saluted each other in that way. And then, suddenly, there came the idea that, by attacking Ethiopia, Italy would recreate the Roman Empire. It had a certain perverse logic: since the King of Ethiopia had the title of Negusa Nagast (king of kings) he could be defined as an "emperor," Then, by defeating him, the King of Italy could take his title and become emperor. Never mind that the ancient Romans never had Ethiopia as a colony, they barely knew it existed. It was a recipe for an "instant empire."  

Italy had two colonies on the border with Ethiopia, and also an old grudge against Ethiopia, having been defeated by the Ethiopians at the battle of Adwa in 1896. But, up to 1934, nothing in the propaganda arsenal of the Fascist regime had identified Ethiopia as an important enemy or a target to be attacked. I went to examine the archives of one of the national newspapers, "La Stampa." I found that, before 1934, there was basically nothing about Ethiopia, except a few articles about local folklore. I also re-read D.H. Lawrence's "Etruscan Places" (written in the late 20s). It was, in many ways, a strong accusation against the Fascist regime, but Lawrence never mentions that Italy had Imperial dreams in Ethiopia. 

Then, on 5 December 1934, there came the "Walwal incident." Italian and Ethiopian troops clashed at the border of Ethiopia and Somaliland, with losses on both sides. From that moment, the Italian press started a campaign of accusations against the Ethiopians said to be attacking the Italian possessions in Eritrea. There started to appear the idea of the "civilizing" mission of Italy in that barbarous country and, finally, the whole soup was sparkled with references to the glory of the Roman Empire that Fascist Italy was going to recreate. And, yes, also young Ethiopian women were part of the deal for the conquerors. 



Less than one year after the Walwal incident, Italy invaded Ethiopia with a force of nearly 700,000 men, an enormous effort for a relatively poor country like Italy. After about 8 months of fighting, Ethiopia surrendered and the King of Italy happily (presumably) took upon himself the title of "Emperor of Ethiopia." The enthusiasm in Italy was beyond what anyone could have imagined: true enthusiasm, not just propaganda. How this mad idea could be swallowed so easily by most Italians is one of the greatest mysteries I encountered in my life. Apart from raping Ethiopian women (which was surely done on a large scale) what did they think exactly to accomplish? But let me not harp on that. 

Just consider the story from the viewpoint of the British. For them, it was an incredible success. First of all, they had been able to deflect the Italian strategic effort toward an objective that, for the British, had little importance. Second, they were forcing Italy to keep a large military force in a region where they had no direct connection with the mainland: it could be resupplied by sea, and only as long as the British allowed it. More than that, the costs of the military campaign and of maintaining the occupation of a land that remained hostile were a tremendous burden. The British then proceeded to further cripple the Italian economy by imposing economic sanctions and zeroing coal exports to Italy. The reaction in Italy was expressed with the slogan "noi tireremo diritto" ("we'll keep going onward"). But it was a devastating blow. Remarkably, the Italians had inflicted all the damage on themselves by themselves. 

A few years later, when World War Two started, the Italians were woefully unprepared. Their military equipment was obsolete, their economy weak, their troops insufficient. At the start of the war, the British proceeded to mop up the Italian forces in Ethiopia: an easy task since the Italians rapidly ran out of supplies. In the meantime, the Italian attempt to march on Suez in 1940 was a major catastrophe. But imagine that they had been able to deploy in Egypt the 120,000 fully equipped troops stranded in Ethiopia. Then, maybe history would have been different. But so it goes. 

Now, the big question: how did the British accomplish this miracle of deception? It may not have been so difficult. The secret of propaganda is no secret at all: just repeat the same thing over and over, letting no contrasting voices appear. Then, you can dominate minds. You saw how well it worked during the past two years with so many good people swayed just because they heard the same things over and over on TV, and they had no contrasting sources of information.

Dictators are not necessarily better than ordinary people at eschewing the destructive action of propaganda. They may, actually, be an even easier target, being often isolated in a knowledge bubble that admits no contrasting voice. We know that, by the 1930s, Mussolini was a lone man at the top, surrounded by yes-men, sycophants, and profiteers. He had no friends who could tell him things that he was not happy to hear, so he was the perfect target for a one-man psyop (using a modern term). Already in 1925, Britain had agreed to sign a treaty known as the "Anglo-Italian Agreement" that said, essentially, "if you want to invade Ethiopia, go ahead, we won't move a finger to stop you." Mussolini may have thought that the British were afraid of him and that they were trying to appease him with concessions. In any case, he waited to be strong enough before acting on this treaty, but eventually he acted the way the British probably were expecting he would. Perhaps, there were other factors (*), but we'll never know for sure. 

The story of Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia is an example of a deception technology that consists in convincing an enemy leader to engage in an attack that he believes will be a cakewalk. Then, sitting back and enjoying the fireworks before intervening for the killing blow. It may have been used against Iraq at the time of Saddam Hussein. And it may have been used in recent times. Note that I don't mean that a leader who squanders his country's resources in a senseless military campaign shares the evil qualities of Benito Mussolini (a racist, bloodthirsty psychopath). It is just that all strong leaders are potential victims of this kind of "one-man psyops." As you know, history rhymes and one of these rhymes goes, "a lone man at the top is one of the most dangerous things in the world."



I already examined the fateful years when Benito Mussolini led Italy to utter defeat in World War 2. My previous posts can be found at these links

https://www.senecaeffect.com/2022/04/when-country-is-destroyed-by-its-own.html

https://www.senecaeffect.com/2022/03/the-world-is-chess-game-is-it-being.html

https://www.senecaeffect.com/2022/05/the-world-as-chess-game-winning-by.html


(*) We may speculate about the role of a specific person in convincing Mussolini that attacking Ethiopia was a good idea. Margherita Sarfatti (1880-1961) was his lover, confident, and mentor from when they met in Milano in 1911. Sarfatti was a Jewish intellectual, an artist, and a writer, sometimes credited with having "created" Mussolini's public image. But she was three years older than him and, with time, her influence on him started to fade. In that fateful year, 1933, Mussolini took another woman as mistress, Claretta Petacci, 28 years younger than him. In the same year, Sarfatti also saw the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, and she couldn't have missed what it meant for her and for the European Jews in general. It was only in 1938 that Sarfatti was forced into exile, but we may imagine that in 1933 she still had a chance to influence Mussolini and deal a deadly blow to him. Did she titillate his vanity by telling him that he could really become the Emperor of a newly created Roman Empire? Was she influenced by the British secret services in order to do that? We shall never know, but one thing is sure: Sarfatti understood perfectly the mechanisms of political power and she was a master propagandist. As an example, here is a piece she wrote -- it seems -- while the Ethiopian invasion was ongoing. I do not hesitate in classing it as one of the best pieces of propaganda ever written. Read and savor it in all its details: it is truly a masterpiece if you remember that propaganda is aimed at simple minds using simple concepts. 

A MAN AND AN EMPIRE

XIV

ACCOUNTS TO BE SETTLED

When the Abyssinians came upon us treacherously at Uol-Uol, the Duce curbed his anger and said: "in Geneva in Switzerland, there is the league of nations that we Italians also founded, so that justice and good agreement between the peoples may be created. Let's hear what they think to do in Geneva to give us satisfaction "

Instead, Geneva washed her hands in her lake: "I don't know anything, the rifles may have fired by themselves". "Oh yes?" said The Duce. "Is this your way of understanding justice? It is no longer the time to make fun of Italy, now we are in the 15th year of the Fascist era".

And he called all the generals of land and air, and the men of the sea, and said, "We must settle old and new accounts with that land of wild slaves. This is the coast of Africa, march down from the North and up from the South, and go and get me all of Ethiopia, with the capital Addis Abeba. I will take care to provide you with men, weapons, ships, orders, and food".

"All right," said the admirals and the land and air generals. "It will be done. Long Live The Duce! Long Live The King!" And all the young men of Italy ran under the tricolor flag with the insignia of the Fascio Littorio, to volunteer in Africa for Italy.

Margherita Sarfatti


UN UOMO E UN IMPERO

xiv

I CONTI DA REGOLARE

Quando gli abissini ci vennero addosso a tradimento a Uol-Uol, i Duce frenò la collera e disse: «A Ginevra nella Svizzera, vi è la Società delle Nazioni che abbiamo fondato anche noi italiani, perchè metta la giustizia e il buon accordo fra i popoli. Sentiamo cosa pensano di fare a Ginevra per darci soddisfazione »

Invece Ginevra si lavò le mani nel suo lago: «lo non so niente, i fucili avranno magari sparato da soli». «Ah si?» disse il Duce. «È questa la maniera vostra di intendere la giustizia? Non è più il tempo di prendere in giro l'ltalia, adesso siamo nell'anno XV dell'era fascista». 

E chiamò tutti i generali di terra e d'aria, e gli ammiragli del mare, e disse: «Bisogna regolare i conti vecchi e nuovi con quel paese di schiavi selvaggi. Questa è la costa dell'Africa, Marciate in giù dal nord e in su dal sud, e andate a prendermi tutta l'Etiopia, con la capitale Addis Abeba. A darvi gli uomini, le armi, le navi, gi ordini e i viveri penso io».

«Va bene», dissero gli ammiragli e i generali di terra e d'aria. «Sarà fatto. Viva il Duce! Viva il Re!» E tutta lo gioventù d'Italia correva sotto la bandiera tricolore con l'insegna del Fascio Littorio, a battersi volontaria in Africa per l'Italia.

Margherita Sarfatti

 


Friday, April 1, 2022

Destroyed by its own Propaganda: How Italy Lost World War II

 


Someday, someone will write a history of the covert psyops of the 20th and 21st centuries. It will surely be a difficult story to unravel, because they are, indeed "covert operations." Yet, it is not impossible to detect certain patterns that repeat all over history's flow. It is an exercise that can help us wade through the tsunami of propaganda we are immersed in, right now. So, rather than delving into the current situation, let me tell you a story of a historical case that we can use as an example. It is a fascinating story, little known outside Italy, but it does tell us how easy it is for a country to self destroy by the wrong use of propaganda, especially with some help from foreign enemy powers. 


Let me tell you the story of how Italy wanted to become a world empire and how it utterly failed at the task, with just a little help from Britain, the Perfidious Albion. We start with the unification of Italy, in 1861, when the Kingdom of Piedmont defeated and annexed the Kingdom of Naples. If that happened, it was because Britain wanted it to happen. 

It was a strategic issue. At that time, Britain controlled the Mediterranean Sea by controlling the two connections with the outside oceans, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, while maintaining a military base on the island of Malta. By the 1830s, Britain had started having problems with France, which was showing ambitions of expanding into the Mediterranean Region. The British had already been shocked by Napoleon's dash into Egypt, which had threatened their whole domination system. They absolutely wanted to avoid that it could happen again. 

Their solution was shrewd and efficient: creating Italy as a unified country. That strip of land right in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea would function as a barrier to stop French expansion in North Africa. And the beauty of the maneuver was that those perfidious Albionics even managed to convince the French ruler, Emperor Louis Napoleon, to help them in the task. How the French could be conned so easily remains a historical mystery that probably nobody ever will solve. But it may have involved the most beautiful woman of that age, Countess of Castiglione.

No matter how, by 1861, Italy was a reality created by the concerted effort of the major Mediterranean Powers of the time. By 1911, the Italian government claimed its rightful chunk of the North African coast, the region we call today "Libya," and that blocked forever all French attempts to expand to create what could have become a French Lake. The Italians were grateful to Britain and spoke of their "Fratellanza" ("brotherhood") with the British.

Everything was going well in the best of worlds when, in the 1920s, something in the strategic engine started clanking ominously. The British suddenly discovered that Italy was not a tender lover, but rather a courtesan who would obey orders only if paid. And in this case, the payment was to be made in hard coal. 

England had been fueling the Italian industrial revolution for about one century by exporting coal to Italy, but now it found that it could not increase production anymore. In the 1920s, nobody had any idea of what was the role of depletion on mineral production, but it was clear that England couldn't produce enough coal to satisfy the appetite of the growing Italian economy. 

Behaving exactly like a courtesan, Italy then started dallying with another lover, Germany, whose coal production was showing no signs of decline. By 1922, Benito Mussolini had taken power in Italy. By 1926, he was the absolute dictator. In terms of international politics, his knowledge was no more than rudimentary, but it didn't take an especially bright mind to understand that the decline of British coal production gave Italy a unique historical chance. By pivoting on German coal, Italy could push Britain out of the Mediterranean Sea and turn it into an Italian Lake. (if the plan had succeeded, maybe you would be reading these notes in Italian!). 

Seen in this light, what happened in 1939 and onward makes perfect sense. We don't know if Mussolini had a specific plan -- from what we know from the notes of his son-in-law, he seemed to be mainly interested in boasting his overinflated ego, making flamboyant gestures, and throwing his weight around. But, on the whole, the behavior of the Italian government during the first two years of the war made sense if the strategic objective was to dominate the Mediterranean region. 

So, Italy attacked Greece in 1940, with the idea of denying the Greek seaports to Britain. At the same time, the army moved Eastward along the North African Coast to attack Egypt. If the Italians had taken Alexandria, it would have meant for the British to lose the Suez Canal and, with it, perhaps the whole war. 

It is bewildering how these two operations, both strategically sound in themselves, became historical disasters. In Greece, the Italians were bogged down for months in the snowy mountains of Epirus and suffered terrible losses. Eventually, the intervention of Germany forced Greece to surrender. But it was an unbelievable slap in the face for Mussolini who had boasted that "we will break Greece's back!

But it was the North African campaign that sealed the fate of Italy. In a few months, the ill-conceived Italian attack on Egypt turned into a rout. Italy lost more than 100.000 soldiers, most of them taken prisoner. It was a kind of loss that a minor power, such as Italy, could not possibly afford. And, as they say, "the rest is history." 

Now, let's pause for a moment to reflect. How was it that Italy found itself so badly unprepared for a task that its ruler, the Duce, had been, theoretically, preparing for years? Italy was not a great power, but it was an industrialized country with plenty of competence in many fields. Italian technology was renowned, especially in aeronautics. Just read the story of the "Schneider Trophy," a speed competition among seaplanes, to see how Italian engineers could compete with their British and American colleagues. And yet, the Italian Air Force found itself tasked with subduing Britain by using obsolete canvas biplanes. How could that be?

Let me propose an interpretation. It involves a certain degree of fantasy and nobody will ever be able to prove that it is true. But, who knows? After all, Albion IS perfidious, as we all know!

So, let's put ourselves in the shoes of British admiralty in the 1920s. We have this problem. This British-created creature, Italy, that was supposed to be just a counterweight against France, now has started to behave like a golem and to disobey its creators. It needs to be controlled before it is too late. Yes, but how? 

As we enter this line of thought, we find an interesting event. In 1925, there was an "exchange of notes" between Britain and Italy regarding Ethiopia. Known as the "Anglo-Italian Agreement" it essentially said that Ethiopia was part of the Italian sphere of influence. This agreement had a deep strategic significance. Essentially, the British were telling Italians, "go ahead, you can do whatever you want in Ethiopia. We won't stop you" Perfidious Albion? I think so. VERY perfidious

There followed a few years of covert planning for an invasion of Ethiopia. It was not an impossible task in itself, but Italy didn't have the kind of "projecting power" that would have allowed its military to invade and control a remote country that was reachable only by sea. It could be done only with the benevolent blessing of Britain -- which is evidently what the Duce was counting on. But never-ever trust those perfidious British, as all continental Europeans know! How Mussolini could be conned in this way is another of the mysteries of history. We already said that at, the time of the unification of Italy, the French ruler, Louis Napoleon, was controlled by using a beautiful woman. But Mussolini had plenty of women and he was more the power-monger type. Controlling him may have involved playing on his inflated manhood, leading him to see himself as the glorious avenger of a previous defeat of the Italian Army in Ethiopia, at Adwa, in 1896. 

No matter how, by 1934 a major propaganda campaign started in Italy with the idea of convincing the public that it was a good idea to conquer Ethiopia. It involved slander campaigns against Ethiopia, scientific studies showing the inferiority of the black races in comparison to the white ones, and how modern Italians were the true heirs of the noble Roman warriors who had created and defended the greatest empire in history. That kind of thing. The slander campaign implied painting Ethiopians as insects to be exterminated with insecticides (it was done for real, using chemical weapons).


After three years of campaign, the Italian public was completely bamboozled into believing that, yes, their destiny was in the "place in the sun," the way Ethiopia started to be described (as if Italy didn't have enough sun). You have to read the documents of the time to understand how well it worked. People were completely hypnotized. Just imagine yourself in 1934 asking the question, "you know, folks, before we attack Ethiopia, wouldn't it be a good idea to carry out a cost-benefit analysis?And you would discover that propaganda reduces the level of the discussion to that of the most stupid person involved in it. 

Propaganda is like a radio set that you can turn on, but cannot turn off. Once it is on, it keeps blaring its music into your ears at full volume, until you can't hear  -- nor even understand -- any other music. Ethiopia was invaded and conquered in 1935, with the appropriate slaughters, exterminations, destructions, and all that. And the new Italian Empire was. The King of Italy proudly (maybe) wore the crown of the Negus Negesti (king of kings) of Ethiopia. How the King could be conned into doing this is another of the mysteries of the universe, but, evidently, even kings are sensitive to propaganda. It was one of the reasons that led him to lose his throne after that World War 2 was over. 

Back to the Perfidious Albion, you see that Britain was shrewd and practical as usual. In 1935, they could have reneged on the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1925. It would have been easy to stop the Italians: didn't Britannia rule above the waves? Just close the Suez Canal to the Italian supply ships, and block the West African ports. The Italian forces in Ethiopia would have had to surrender in a few months, at best. Or do you think that the Italian Navy would have circumnavigated Africa and steamed all the way to the Indian Ocean to challenge the British Navy? Sure, what could go wrong? What do these roast beefs from Britain know about naval warfare?  

That's the beauty of being truly perfidious. You can manhandle your enemy much more by keeping your word than by reneging it. The bemused British looked at the Italian performance in Ethiopia. Then, when the outnumbered and outgunned Ethiopians surrendered, Albion struck: Embargo of coal and of all mineral commodities against Italy. 

It was another step forward in perfidy. The embargo gave the Fascist propaganda another handle to start with a new vicious campaign. The Italians were in a certain sense correct in being enraged -- actually livid. The British themselves had told them that Ethiopia was part of the Italian sphere of influence, and now they were embargoing Italy for having done exactly what they had said Italy could do. For having done something that other European powers, including Britain, had been doing all the time: conquering and annexing African countries. 

Again, "the rest is history." After the enormous costs of a campaign that involved sending and keeping 400,000 troops in a remote region of the world, Italy almost bled to death in the attempt of keeping its possessions in Ethiopia, weakened by the need of keeping more than 100,000 fully equipped troops there, burdened by the costs of the colonial administration, stuck into an impossible strategic situation in which it was supposed to defend a territory that couldn't be resupplied. The beauty of perfidy is how the results are incomparably bigger than the efforts. 

All this, was because someone, in Italy, decided to start a major propaganda effort in 1934, convincing people that conquering Ethiopia was a good idea. Am I a conspiracy theorist if I say that this idea was "planted" in Italy by a perfidious foreign power? Maybe......

______________________________________________________

This story of an ancient propaganda disaster makes no direct reference to the current world situation. But I guess that my readers are smart enough to understand what I wanted to say. I think we are in a desperate situation. Either we manage to get rid of propaganda, one way or another, or that thing we call the "Western Civilization" is destined to go down the Seneca Cliff, just like the Italian Empire did in 1943. But, whatever happens, it will happen because it had to.

Also, note that my use of the term "Perfidious Albion" does not imply disparaging Britain or anything British. You may have noted that I use the term with a certain degree of admiration, which I think is fully deserved in this case. Bertolt Brecht said once that "it is tiring being evil." Being perfidious is at least elegant! 

Finally, I would mention my uncle, Giovanni Piccinni, who fought in North Africa at the battle of El Alamein as a member of the division Folgore. He was a good man, brave and upright. His only problem was that he had been exposed to the Fascist propaganda so much that he came to believe it completely, and so he never complained having been sent to fight in a hopeless situation from where he managed to come back unscathed, almost miraculously. But so is life -- our minds are fragile things. 


Monday, March 28, 2022

Solutions that Worsen the Problem: Economic Sanctions

 

Economic Sanctions seem to be becoming more and more popular. There is no doubt that they can do a lot of damage to the targeted countries and, in some case, they are true weapons of mass destruction. But are they effective for the purposes they are supposed to have? (image from "Democracy Digest")


Economic sanctions are relatively new: and I can't find anything like that in ancient history. The oldest version known is probably the European blockade enacted by Napoleon against Britain from 1806 to 1814. It damaged more the blocking nations (Europe) than the blocked one (Britain). 

The next important blockade was enacted during World War I against the Central Empires. This one was successful, at least in terms of damaging the blocked nations. The victims of starvation caused by the sanctions are probably to be measured in millions. But whether something is a "success" depends on how you define it. You may argue that the sanctions made the survivors angry enough that they sought revenge 20 years later, with World War II. 

Another important case of economic sanctions was enacted against Italy in 1935 as a punishment for having invaded Ethiopia. In terms of economic damage, it may have been successful: the Italian economy was badly hit. But we could argue that the wrecking of the Italian Economy was more a result of the war expenses than of the sanction. In any case, it made Italians angry enough that they thought it was a good idea to declare war on Britain in 1940. It wasn't, as they soon discovered. 

These examples suggest that sanctions are an effective weapon against weak countries. Actually, they can be a true weapon of mass destruction directed against civilians. Whether they can accomplish anything useful, is another matter. If history tells us something, it is that sanctions tend to achieve results that are exactly the opposite of the intended ones, at least officially. 

And not just that. Sanctions often hurt the sanctioners as much as the sanctioned ones. So, it is hard to understand why they are so popular, especially in a world where we tend to glorify "free trade." But, right now, they are like the Colt .45 at the belt of a gunman in a Western Movie: the first thing that appears as soon as a crisis develops. There may be some logic in the idea, though. After all, sanctions are an inexpensive way to give the impression that the government is "doing something." That is what politicians are looking for. Their worst fear is being labeled as "weak," and the sanctions offer them a chance to avoid that.        

Will the current sanctions against Russia obtain anything useful? We have to see that but, so far, it seems that the rule that sanctions are a solution that worsens the problem is being confirmed. Not only the Russian public remains in favor of the "special operation" in Ukraine, but the sanctions seem to be hurting Western Europe more than Russia. But we are just at the beginning of the story, and we'll have to see what happens in the long run. 

For a historical perspective, below I discuss the case of the sanctions against Italy enacted in 1935.


Sunday, December 8, 2019

The Effect of the Sanctions: Is Italy Cracking Down Under the Strain?


Posted on "Cassadra's Legacy" in December 2019, republished with a different title and some modifications 


We can learn a lot about the effects of economic sanctions from the story of how Italy reacted to the international economic sanctions imposed on the country in 1935 by a coalition of World Powers. Above, a photo from 1935. It shows a stone slab with the engraved words, "On 18 November 1935, the world besieged Italy. Perennial infamy on those who favored and consumed this absurd crime." Most of these slabs were destroyed after the defeat of Italy in WW2, but some can still be found.


In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia, at that time the only remaining free African country. Why exactly that happened is a long story. Let me just say that, in part, it was a revenge for a defeat suffered long before, when an early attempt at invading Ethiopia had failed. In part, it also had to do with reacting to the financial crash of 1929: governments often tend to seek for external enemies to distract people from internal troubles. Then, in part, it was seen as a way to displease the hated British, seen as guilty of not providing for Italy the coal that the Italian economy needed. And, finally, it had to do with some nebulous dreams about rebuilding the Roman Empire. It may sound silly, today, but if you read what people wrote at that time in Italy, the idea of creating a new Roman Empire was taken seriously.

Whatever the reasons, in 1935 the Ethiopian army was overwhelmed by the modern weaponry deployed by Italy: modern guns, planes, tanks, and the like, with the added help of poison gas bombing, a military innovation for that time. The final result was that the King of Italy gained the dubious honor of taking for himself the title of "Emperor of Ethiopia" and that Italy gained "a place in the sun" in Africa, as the propaganda described the results of the campaign.

A victory, yes, but a hollow one. From the beginning, Ethiopia was only a burden to the Italian economy, and the costs of the military occupation were just too much for the already strained Italian finances. The final result was perhaps the shortest-lived empire in history: it lasted just five years, collapsing in 1941 when the Italian forces in Ethiopia were quickly defeated by a coalition of Ethiopian and allied forces.

An interesting side effect of the invasion of Ethiopia was the story of the imposition of economic sanctions on Italy by the League of the Nations. It was a half-hearted effect to stop the invasion, but the war lasted just 8 months and the sanctions were dropped just two months afterward. Their effect was nearly zero in economic and military terms but, in political terms, it was a completely different story, and the consequences reverberated for years. Here are some of these consequences:

1. The Italians were not only appalled at the sanctions, they were positively enraged, appalled, livid. According to the international laws of the time, for a state to attack another was not in itself a crime (unlike the use of chemical weapons, but that came to be known only later). So, most Italians felt that they were punished for having done something -- annexing an African country -- that the other Western Powers had done many times before without anyone complaining. The result was a burst of national pride and a strong wave of popular support for the war. That generated also a wave of personal popularity for the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini, seen as the one who was making Italy great again (some things never change in politics).

2. The sanctions soon were presented by the government's propaganda as an epic and grandiose struggle undertaken by the glorious "proletarian nation" that Italy was against a coalition of the great plutocracies of the world, Britain in particular. And, by defeating this coalition, Italy showed that it was a great power, too, on a par with the others. This idea had terrible consequences when it led the Duce, Benito Mussolini, to think that Italy could match the military capabilities of the major world powers in WW2.

3. The government propaganda in Italy also used the sanctions to magnify the importance of the Ethiopian campaign. If the Northern Plutocrats had reacted so violently against Italy, it was because they feared Italy very much. As a result, Ethiopia became a national priority, to be kept at all costs. At the start of WW2, Italy had more than 100,000 fully equipped troops there. Without the possibility of being resupplied from Italy, these troops had no chance against the British, and they were rapidly wiped out. What might have happened if they had been available in other war theaters? It is unlikely that the final outcome of WW2 would have changed, but, who knows? The battle for Egypt in 1942 could have had a different outcome if Italy had been able to field 100,000 more troops there and, maybe, take the Suez Canal.

This catalog of disasters is so impressive that we might wonder if the sanctions were not just the result of incompetence and idiocy, but of an evil machination. Could it be that the British wanted Italy to engage in an adventure that was sure to lead the country to ruin, a few years later? Of course, it is unlikely that the British had been planning exactly for what happened, but it is not impossible that they understood that the Italian military apparatus would be weakened by the task of keeping Ethiopia and that would make Italy a less dangerous adversary in case of an all-out military conflict. If the British had planned that, they truly deserved the reputation they had at the time (and that they still have) described with the name of the "Perfidious Albion."